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Abstract:
While most observers feel that interest groups inﬂuence parliamentary decisions, direct evidence on this topic
is scarce. Matching parliamentary votes with referendum results helps to bridge this gap. Existing research for
politicians of the Swiss Lower House of Parliament suggests that the number of sectional and cause interest
groups aﬀect the quality of political representation. We extend this analysis to majority-elected politicians of
the Upper House and by more than 50 referendum decisions for the Lower House. Our results show that the
pure number of sectional or cause groups does not aﬀect defection of politicians from their constituents which
suggests that the generalizability of the results may be limited.
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1 Introduction
The idea that interest groups aﬀect political representation is an old one. Amajor diﬀiculty of empirical studies
on political representation is to elicit constituents’ preferences on legislative proposals and confront themwith
decisions by political representatives (see, among others, Gerber & Lewis 2004; Golder & Stramski 2010; Lott &
Davis 1992; Matsusaka 2010). A way out of this dilemma is to assess the impact of interest groups on political
representation by comparing referendum results in Switzerland with legislative decisions made by members
of the parliament (MPs). Swiss constituents regularly reveal their preferences for diﬀerent policies by voting
in referenda (see Frey 1994; Hessami 2016). The preferences of the majority of constituents can be confronted
with identically-worded decisions by MPs from the same constituencies to obtain a direct measure of political
congruence (or inversely defection) as discussed in Portmann, Stadelmann, and Eichenberger (2012).1 This type
of analysis is also successfully pursued by Giger and Klüver (2016) (henceforth GK) who assess the inﬂuence
of diﬀerent types of interest groups on members of the proportionally-elected Lower House of Parliament.
GK employ our original measure of defection and distinguish two types of interest groups, i. e. sectional and
cause groups (see Klüver 2012). Their results suggest that MPs with ties to more sectional groups have a higher
probability to defect from the majority of their constituents, while having aﬀiliations with cause groups fosters
congruence between MPs and their constituents. GK’s innovation is to analyze diﬀerences between diﬀerent
types of interest groups. Their analysis is an important step forward compared to existing literature on MP
defection which only analyzed the total number of interest groups (see Portmann, Stadelmann & Eichenberger
2012).
However, GK focus only on proportionally-elected politicians. The employed measure of MP defection is,
however, fundamentally majoritarian as it confronts the decisions of individual MPs with the preferences of
the majority of constituents. We extend the analysis of GK by employing a new dataset on politicians from the
Swiss Upper House of Parliament and measure MP defection in the identical way. A major diﬀerence between
the two houses is the electoral system:MPs from the Lower House are elected in a proportional system (see GK,
p. 194) while MPs of the Upper House are elected under a majoritarian system. It is well known that electoral
systems aﬀect the way individual politicians represent their constituents’ preferences and who is blamed for
defection (see, among others, Cox 1990; Powell 2009; Stadelmann, Portmann & Eichenberger 2013). It can be
expected that majority-elected politicians face pressure to represent the electoral center independently of the
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types of interest groupswithwhich they are aﬀiliated as they need to appease themajority of their constituents.
Proportionally-elected politicians, on the other hand, have more leeway to cater for diﬀerent interests at the
margins of the electoral spectrum such that diﬀerent interest groups may yield an inﬂuence. We confront MP’s
parliamentary votes from theUpperHousewith referendumoutcomes on identical issues and analyzewhether
sectional and cause groups aﬀect MP defection.
Our results show that neither the number of sectional nor cause groups explain defection of majority-elected
politicians from their constituents’preferences at statistically signiﬁcant levels. Point estimates suggest a close to
zero impact of both types of interest groups onMP defection. This pattern even holds when using the identical
dataset as GK for proportionally-elected politicians but focusing on MPs from districts with one or two seats,
who are, in fact, elected by close to majority vote.2 These results point to potential limits of the generalizability
of GK’s ﬁndings and we oﬀer a brief discussion why diﬀerent results may emerge. Given GK’s ﬁndings for
proportionally-elected MPs and our evidence for majority-elected MPs, we interpret the existing evidence so
far as suggestive that the institutional setting, and, in particular, the electoral system,3 may have the potential
to moderate the role interest groups play for political representation.
2 ParliamentaryVotes, Referenda and Interest Groups
We assess the impact of interest groups on political representation by employing the same approach to clas-
sify sectional and cause groups as GK, and we combine legislative votes cast by MPs with voter preferences
from Swiss referenda (as in earlier contributions by Portmann, Stadelmann & Eichenberger 2012; Stadelmann,
Portmann & Eichenberger 2013; Stadelmann, Portmann & Eichenberger 2013). However, we do not exclusively
focus on proportionally-elected MPs but employ a new dataset for majority-elected MPs.
Switzerland oﬀers an ideal setting for investigating how interest groups shape the relationship between
voters and politicians. First, Swiss MPs have to disclose all their interest aﬀiliations in a public register which
is easily accessible and often referred to in media reports. Second, the Swiss practice of submitting measures
identical to those voted on by MPs to referenda allows comparing the behavior of constituents and their MPs
on exactly the same issues. Referenda permit constituents to judge diﬀerent policies and rank them against the
status quo. MatchingMP votes with referendum outcomes yields analytical leverage as instances in whichMPs
voted contrary to the constituent preferences can be identiﬁed.4
The Swiss Parliament is made up of two houses, theNationalratwhich can be looked at as the Lower House
(analyzed in the study by GK) and the Ständerat which is the Upper House Upper House (analyzed in this
study). The Lower House has 200 members who are elected under a proportional system. The Upper House
has 46 members elected under a majoritarian system in the same electoral districts as MPs from the Lower
House.5 Both Houses have identical power in the legislative process, i. e. proposals have to pass both Houses to
be adopted and the formal requirements and prerogatives to be elected in the two Houses are identical, apart
from the electoral system (see Stadelmann, Portmann & Eichenberger 2013).
While ﬁnal votes in the Lower House are recorded by an electronic voting system, such a system has only
been installed in the Upper House in spring 2014. MPs in the Upper House simply held up their hands which
were then counted by two tellers. Since winter 2006, however, a camera records the sessions of the Upper House
and video streams are available on the internet such that voting behavior of MPs can be identiﬁed as it is
observable on the video recording. We have collected and analyzed the video streams since the installation
of the camera and thereby identify MP voting behavior in 1,963 cases for 57 diﬀerent ﬁnal votes which were
subsequently presented to constituents in referenda between 2008 and 2014.
Defection of an MP is measured by a dichotomous variable and occurs if the MP voted in the Upper House
diﬀerently to the majority of her constituents. This way of measuring defection is identical to how GKmeasure
MP defection. We identify the interest aﬀiliations from the oﬀicial register for all MPs and we classify their
aﬀiliation the same way as GK into sectional and cause groups.
3 Research design and results
Our research design is straightforward and comparable to GK: We explain defection of MPs from the majority
of their constituents in Table 1. Defection is explained by the number of sectional and cause interest groups.
To give interest groups the best chance to exert an impact on defection, we start with a non-stringent setting
in Model (1), include additional controls in Models (2) to (4) and ﬁnally estimate a conservative full control,
canton, party, and referendum consistent ﬁxed-eﬀects setting in Model (5).
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3.1 Interest GroupsDoNot ExplainMPDefection
Results of Model (1) are from a multi-level logistic regression with random-eﬀects for cantons (electoral dis-
tricts) and parties as employed by GK but for the Upper House instead of the Lower House. We do not include
any other variables apart from controls for referendum type (obligatory referendum, facultative referendum,
and initiative as the omitted category).
Table 1: The eﬀect of lobbying on defection of MPs in the upper house.
DV: MP defection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Explanatory
variables
No. of sectional
groups
0.004 0.005 0.013 0.012 0.010
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
No. of cause groups 0.0001 0.005 0.002 0.002 −0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Oﬀicial party
position congruence
−0.856* −0.931* −0.786*
(0.152) (0.160) (0.196)
Closeness of
referendum
5.092* 5.204*
(0.653) (0.662)
Closeness of
parliamentary
decision
−0.363 −0.351
(0.453) (0.459)
No. of months until
next election
0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Obligatory
referendum
−1.335* −1.242* −1.358* −1.276*
(0.198) (0.211) (0.199) (0.213)
Facultative
referendum
0.119 −0.041 0.120 −0.049
(0.111) (0.118) (0.113) (0.120)
Constant −0.812* 0.423*** −0.967 0.572 2.346**
(0.122) (0.221) (0.596) (0.644) (0.964)
Random eﬀects
Canton-level
variance
0.001 0.002
Party-level variance 0.022 0.027
Fixed eﬀects
Canton ﬁxed-eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Party ﬁxed-eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Referendum
ﬁxed-eﬀects
No No No No Yes
Model ﬁt
N 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963
Log likelihood −1135.879 −1089.089
AIC 2285.758 2200.179
BIC 2324.834 2261.583
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.144 0.408
Chi-square 110.311* 207.033* 657.063*
(df = 36) (df = 40) (df = 87)
∗ p < 0.01;
∗∗ p < 0.05;
∗∗∗ p < 0.1Logit coe昀�ﬁcients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Results ofModels 1 and 2 are from a cross-classiﬁedmultilevel logistic regression
glmer function in R. Results ofModel 3, 4 and 4 are from consistent ﬁxed-e昀�fects logistic regressions.
Model (1) reveals that sectional and cause interest groups do not aﬀect the extent of defection of majority-
elected MPs. Point estimates are insigniﬁcant and close to zero.6 Model (2) controls for additional variables.7
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Again, sectional and cause groups do not explain any defection of MPs from their constituents at statistically
signiﬁcant levels. In contrast to the negative eﬀect of cause groups on defection of MPs of the Lower House
shown by GK, we observe, if anything, twice a positive sign for sectional and cause groups on defection.
Froma statistical point of view, party and canton ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations correspond to amore stringent test
than random-eﬀects estimations. Fixed-eﬀects estimations do not require assumptions regarding the expected
value of the coeﬀicients for the ﬁxed-eﬀects and such estimations are consistent even if the true model is a
random-eﬀectsmodel (see Cameron&Trivedi 2005).We take account of party and canton ﬁxed-eﬀects inModel
(3) and Model (4). Again, neither sectional nor cause interest groups have any explanatory power on defection.
Point estimates are close to zero and relatively precise. The diﬀerence between the coeﬀicients for section and
cause interest groups is not statistically signiﬁcant. Calculating the discrete eﬀect for doubling the median
number of sectional groups (from 3 to 6 groups) and the median number of cause groups (from 3 to 6) yields
twice a small positive but statistically insigniﬁcant change in the probability to defect of +0.785 %-points and
+0.126 %-points, respectively. Adding one additional sectional group or one additional cause groups, increases
defection by merely +0.261 %-points and +0.041 %-points.
Finally, we include referendum ﬁxed-eﬀects in Model (5). This insures that neither diﬀerences between can-
tons, parties or referenda bias our coeﬀicients of interest for sectional and cause interest groups. In particular,
referendum ﬁxed-eﬀects take account of all diﬀerences between referenda such as salience, closeness, refer-
endum types, etc. such that these controls and other potentially unobserved variables are fully accounted for
which is a major advantage of ﬁxed-eﬀects settings. We ﬁnd, once again, no statistically signiﬁcant and quan-
titatively relevant eﬀect of interest groups on MP defection. Thus, sectional or cause interest groups do not
seem to aﬀect political representation for a sample of majority-elected politicians which points to a potential
limitation regarding the generalizability of GK’s ﬁndings.
3.2 Reﬁnements and Further Tests
In Table 2, we reﬁne our analysis and provide further evidence that defection of majority-elected MPs is not
explained by the number of their interest group aﬀiliations, be it sectional or cause groups.
While GK’s idea to distinguish sectional and cause interest groups is appealing, it is comparatively new
for economists and in public discussions, such a distinction is rarely made. Prior to GK’s analyses, results
by Portmann, Stadelmann, and Eichenberger (2012) for proportionally-elected politicians indicated a negative
eﬀect of the total number of interest groups on defection. Models (1) and (2) show that the total number of
interest groups does not explain MP defection in the Upper House, i. e. the majority-elected politicians with
more interest groups in general do neither deviate more nor less from their constituents.
District sizes vary in Switzerland between 1 and 34. Depending on population size, there are eight districts
with one or two MPs in the Lower House. For MPs from these districts, electoral incentives are comparable
to majority-elected MPs in the Upper House (see the discussion in GK’s conclusion, p. 202). In Model (3) we
employ the identical dataset as used by GK, but focus on a subset of districts with one or two seats, i. e. we
focus on MPs in the GK dataset who are in fact majority-elected. Results indicate that interest groups do not
explain defection from the majority’s preferences any more for this subsample. In Model (4) we restrict the GK
dataset to cantons with more than two representatives, i. e. on these MPs who are elected proportionally, we
reestablish GK’s quantitative and qualitative results.
Table 2: Reﬁnements and further tests.
DV: MP defection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(GK)
Model 4
(GK)
Model 5 Model 6
(GK)
Sample analyzed all Upper
House
all Upper
House
1 or 2 seats
Lower
House
>2 seats
Lower
House
all Upper
House
1 or 2 seats
Lower
House
Explanatory variables
No. of all groups 0.003 (0.009) 0.009 (0.014)
No. of sectional groups −0.010
(0.016)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.012 (0.018) −0.004
(0.016)
No. of cause groups −0.069
(0.065)
−0.033*
(0.009)
0.001 (0.025) −0.029
(0.069)
No. of sectional groups
(Party)
−0.004
(0.007)
−0.0004
(0.003)
No. of cause groups
(Party)
−0.008
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.003)
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Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random eﬀects
Canton-level variance 0.0001 0.040 0.212 0.033
Party-level variance 0.022 0.126 0.021 0.207
Fixed eﬀects
Canton ﬁxed-eﬀects No Yes No No Yes No
Party ﬁxed-eﬀects No Yes No No Yes No
Referendum
ﬁxed-eﬀects
No Yes No No Yes No
Model ﬁt
N 1963 1963 1078 19182 1963 1078
Log likelihood −1135.86 −586.057 −10983.57 −583.86
AIC 2283.721 1196.114 21993.15 1197.72
BIC 2317.214 1255.909 22095.35 1272.463
Pseudo R2 0.408 0.409
Chi-square 657.2* (df =
86)
659.1* (df =
89)
∗ p < 0.01;
∗∗ p < 0.05;
***p < 0.1
Logit coe昀�ﬁcients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Results ofModel 1, 3, 4 and 6 are from a cross-classiﬁedmultilevel logistic regression glmer
function in R. Results ofModel 2 and 5 are from consistent ﬁxed-e昀�fects logistic regressions. “Other controls” include the same set as in Table 1 and the number
ofMPs per canton inModels (4) and (6).
GK introduced in some of their analyses the aggregate number of interest groups per party, i. e. they intro-
duce two new variables for each individual politician which reﬂect the sum of all sectional and cause interest
groups of politicians from their parties. These variables are the same for all MPs with the same party aﬀiliation
and politicians from larger parties have more interest groups by construction. This makes the interpretation
of these variables diﬀicult in regressions because the number of interest groups at the party level also changes
as the number of politicians increases. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we follow their approach in
Model (5) for MPs of the Upper House and Model (6) for MPs of the Lower House from cantons with one or
two seats. We do not observe any signiﬁcant or quantitatively relevant eﬀect of the number of sectional or cause
groups of MPs or their parties on defection.
3.3 InterpretingDi昀�ferences Between theAnalyses
GK suggest that being aﬀiliated with more sectional (cause) interest groups leads to more (less) defection of
proportionally-elected politicians while we observe zero eﬀects for sectional as well as cause interest groups for
majority-elected politicians. We believe that the existing results can be interpreted as suggestive evidence that
the centripetal forces of a majoritarian system render the inﬂuence of interest groups less relevant. However,
diﬀerent results may also be due to a diﬀerent (self-) selection of politicians into the houses. Moreover, our
main result for majority-elected politicians in Table 1 is based on fewer observations due to a lower number of
referenda and a lower number of politicians in the Upper House than GK’s original results. We also analyze
a more recent time period (2008 to 2014 instead of 1996 to 2009). Finally, we employ GK’s concept to catego-
rize sectional and cause interest groups and while the dichotomous classiﬁcation is mostly straightforward
classiﬁcation issues arise in some instances such as for trusts or pension funds.8
We can rule out the third and fourth point as sources for diﬀerences by employing GK’s dataset but restrict
it to MPs from districts with only one or two seats, as proportional representation with district magnitude of
one and two comes close to majority elections.
We have also categorized interest groups aﬀiliated with proportionally elected-politicians from the Lower
House for the full sample from 1996 to 2014 and extend thereby the original GK dataset by six years or about a
third in terms of referenda (see Online Appendix). We reconﬁrm for this extended sample the negative eﬀect
of cause groups on defection and a positive, though statistically insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of sectional groups on MP
defection in the LowerHouse. Restricting the sample toMPs from the LowerHouse and the time frame that can
be analyzed for the UpperHouse (2008–2014) we ﬁnd that all coeﬀicients forMPs from the LowerHouse exhibit
the same sign as in GK, though they are slightly smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant (see Online Appendix).9
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4 Conclusions and future research recommendations
In their inspiring contribution, GK show that MPs with more ties to sectional interest groups exhibit a higher
defection from voters, while having more ties to cause interest groups decreases defection. Defection is mea-
sured as incongruence between MPs’ roll call votes and their constituents’ majority decisions in referenda on
identical legislative proposals. Whereas GK’s analysis is based on proportionally-elected politicians, we extend
it to new data for majority-elected MPs employing otherwise an identical approach.
Our results show that the number of interest groups, whether sectional or cause groups, do not explain de-
fection ofmajority-elected MPs from their constituents. Given the existing evidence in the literature and our new
results, we speculate that diﬀerences in the relative strength of centrifugal and centripetal forces in propor-
tional vs majoritarian system contribute to moderating the eﬀect of interest groups on MP defection. Thereby,
we point to a potentially important factor which may limit the generalizability of GK’s ﬁndings.
GK’s results together with our extension open new avenues for research. Further theoretical analyses on
the interaction between electoral systems and the inﬂuence of interest groups seem promising. The relation-
ship between parties and interest groups also needs to be explored as diﬀerences between proportional and
majoritarian systems shape the eﬀect that parties have on representation. Finally, we hope that future studies
for other countries, diﬀerent electoral systems and diﬀerent institutional settingswhere interest group inﬂuence
can be explored will stimulate further comparative research on this topic.
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Notes
1Comparing referendumandMPs’decisions in general is also recommended andperformed in Stadelmann et al. (2012, 2013) or Brunner,
Ross, and Washington (2013) as a new approach to measure congruence.
2Re-estimating GK with an extended dataset for proportionally-elected politicians in an online appendix, we tend to conﬁrm their
original results although they lose statistical signiﬁcance for sectional interest groups.
3Eﬀects of institutions and electoral systems as well as the moderating role of party discipline are discussed in Fredriksson and
Wollscheid (2014) or Stadelmann, Portmann, and Eichenberger (2013).
4Such direct measures of MP defection are usually not available and the literature tends to rely on proxies, surveys or other indirect
ways to measure defection, rent-seeking or illicit behavior of politicians (see, e. g., Bender and Lott 1996; for an early discussion or more
recently Ågren, Dahlberg & Mörk 2007; Ruske 2015; or Kauder and Potrafke 2016).
5Exceptions are the Canton of Jura and since the end of 2011 the Canton of Neuchâtel that apply a proportional system for their two
members. Omitting them does not change the results.
6If we do not control for referendum types and if we do not account for random-eﬀects for cantons and parties, the same results emerge:
Interest groups do not aﬀect defection of majority-elected MPs.
7We do not include variables such as “No. of MPs per canton” into the estimation because they are only relevant for the proportionally-
elected MPs analyzed by GK but not so for the majority-elected MPs from the Upper House analyzed here.
8Employing the GK’s data but restricting their sample to districts with only one or two seats yields no signiﬁcant results for both types
of interest groups (Table 2, Model 3 and 6). While the employed subset represents a fraction of the total number of observations, we analyze
in all our models more than 1,000 observations which should allow for robust statistical inference.
9The eﬀects of the number of sectional and cause groups at the party level remain statistically signiﬁcant. Note again that the eﬀect of
the number of groups at the party level is diﬀicult to interpret as individual politicians are analyzed.
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